H-JAPAN
January 8, 1999
(crosspost from H-US-Japan)
H-NET BOOK REVIEW
Published by H-US-Japan@h-net.msu.edu (January 1999)
Susan Maybaumwisniewski and Mary Sommerville ed. _Blue Horizon:
United States-Japan-PRC Tripartite Relations_. Washington D.C.:
National Defense University, 1997. xv + 203 pp. Bibliographical
references. ISBN 1-57906-038-2.
Reviewed for H-US-Japan by Jing Zhao
"How Should We Integrate China's Emergence as a Potential Superpower?"
According to the Press Secretary of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) on November 26, 1998, the history
of Sino-Japanese relations with Taiwan was the main topic of the
summit meeting between President Jiang Zemin of the People's
Republic of China and Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi of Japan.
Jiang reiterated that the issue of Taiwan pertained to China's
sovereignty, and emphasized the importance of Japan's abidance
the Joint Communiqu牢of 1972. He also referred to the
Japan-U.S. security cooperation saying, again, that the focus
should be Taiwan. To include Taiwan in the Japan-U.S. security
cooperation, in particular the Japan-U.S. Guidelines for Defense
Cooperation, would be an interference in the domestic affairs of China.
The Japanese government's response was nothing new for China.
They had no other choice, Japan argued: just before Jiang's
arrival, the U.S. President visited Tokyo, and the U.S. Defense
Department issued its "East Asia Strategy Report," in a revised
version, which clearly stated that China afforded challenges.
The book under review is a collection from the U.S. National
Defense University's 1996 Pacific Symposium "U.S.-Japan-PRC
Tripartite Relations: Foundations for a Stable Community?"
Though the specific objective of the symposium and the goal of
the book are "to better understand how these three nations might
influence the future in the Asian-Pacific region," regretfully
there is not a single article dealing mainly with Japan. No
article deals specifically with the U.S. either, though most
authors in the book develop their discussion with the U.S.'s
China and Japan policy as a precondition. This reflects the
fact that Japan is the smallest player among the three powers.
Voices directly from Japan, however, especially those other than
the Japanese government (which follows the U.S.) -- such as Asahi
Shinbum's Yoichi Funabashi or Meijigakuin University's Motofumi
Asai -- should be given a hearing.
As a conference collection, the level and relevance of the
articles in this book vary. It includes good reviews of
Sino-European relations (David Shambaugh), and of Russia's
security and economic interests in the Asian-Pacific region
(Yevgeniy Afanasyev, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs). It
also contains tedious lectures and a statistical report (Bilver
Singh, Akio Watanabe, and Frank Ching). Among many "facts"
listed in Singh's article, for instance, one is that "economic
power cannot earn a country international respect, as the
Japanese discovered the limits of their 'checkbook diplomacy' in
the Gulf War" (p. 99). It would have been better had Singh
specified which Japanese and what kind of "international
respect" he means. Many Japanese, and many international
societies, also believe that Japan could earn international
respect if its government dared refuse to pay the check for that war.
Citing mainly from China's official statements (Deng Xiaoping,
Jiang Zeming, Li Peng and _Beijing Review_), Xinbo Wu's "China
as a cooperative power" offers a defensive Chinese view. For
example, "the [Weapons of Mass Destruction] regime does not
prohibit sale of advanced manned-aircraft capable of delivering
WMD, such as F-15s and F-16s, which are produced by the United
States and its allies. According to the regime, what China can
produce [missiles] is prohibited from exporting, while what it
cannot manufacture can be sold" (p. 126). While China's foreign
policy is still strictly dominated by the central regime, voices
from ordinary people have been reflected in the government (for
example, concerning Japan's war reparations). Even some
passionate nationalistic statements have appeared in the media.
One 1996 best-seller declared: "China will never be led by other
powers. The U.S. should better lead itself only. Japan cannot
even lead itself."
The "WE" view expressed from several U.S. strategists is the
most valuable part of this book. Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt's
keynote address suggests a "balance of interests" approach among
the three powers to "accommodate the interests of all the
players without conflict." To achieve this "equilibrium," among
other suggestions, McDevitt proposes maintaining a continued
strong "by-invitation" U.S. military presence in the region,
and allowing "an adequate" Japanese Defense Force capable of
defending its own territorial integrity and "close to being able
to defend air and sea lane out to 1,000 miles from the home
islands" (p. 7). As for China, he suggests "WE" satisfy China's
interest "to be taken seriously and receive the accord expected
of a Great Power" (p. 7). However, China may not have such an
interest (for example, during the WTO negotiation process).
Following the same line, James Kelly discusses integrating China
through the use of multilateral structure and mechanisms, with
the condition that "forward deployed American military and naval
forces must continue to be the heart of its political and
security strategy in East Asia" (p. 49). Ralph Cossa's short
piece compares the military capabilities of the three powers.
He asserts that Japan "is not a threat to anyone and is not
likely to become one anytime soon, provided the U.S.-Japan
alliance remains intact" (p. 52). He also stresses Japan's more
active role in regional and global defense arrangements should
not be seen as threatening to anyone, especially if done "within
the framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance" (p. 56). This pushing
of Japan's armament policy has puzzled this book reviewer for
years since the end of the so-called "Cold War." Does the U.S.
not know that a militarized Japan will be isolated from Asian
people? The U.S. does know that an isolated Japan will be more
dependent on the U.S. Obuchi feels this: when Jiang "[spoke]
frankly in the interests of the future," he could not offer any
rebuttal.
Nancy Tucker continues this integrating theme with a discussion
of a specific topic involving the three powers: the Taiwan
question. Actually, the Taiwan question is the core issue of
the Sino-American relations, the Sino-Japanese relations, and
the tripartite interactions. Many U.S. analysts like to
develop their discussion based on the current image of
"democratic Taiwan vs. authoritative China," as many did with
the frame of "free China vs. Communist China" in the so-called
Cold War time. However, nobody can avoid the historical
linkage: where does the Taiwan question come from? For this
reason, Tucker does not illustrate a clear-cut policy, nor does
the U.S. government.
According to this how-should-we-integrate-China theme, the U.S.
is a veteran power player, skillful in handling international
affairs, while China is a newly rising power. Thus, in order to
avoid a vital confrontation (as that brought about by Germany
and Japan), the U.S. should teach China to follow the rules.
Seen otherwise, China -- having a thousand years experience as a
great power, if not THE great power (while the U.S. has only
decades of experience)--, is still a country with a clear vision, and
enough wisdom to implement its foreign policy, with the U.S and
Japan as its first and second priorities. What China lacks is the
means (i.e., the power) to realize its goals.
Since China's "Reform and Openness" policy, many Chinese youths
have studied in the U.S., Japan, and Europe (thousands of them
have obtained Ph. D's), but how many U.S. and Japan's China
specialists can speak fluent Chinese? When Hosokawa, Japan's
Prime Minister, visited China, MOFA could not even provide a
qualified translator for him (the woman translator assigned by
the Chinese government intentionally mistranslated some
politically sensitive words). It is obvious who knows whom better.
If we assume that 20% of Chinese can read English and 10% of
Chinese can read Japanese, then the tripartite theme might be
changed to: how should WE integrate the U.S. and Japan? This
would not be more ridiculous than the theme of the book.
Certainly, there is no guarantee that China will emerge as a
superpower. Many inside reports indicate that China is facing a
more serious systematic crisis than it had before 1989. The key
factor, i.e., China's democratization, is vital not only to the
country's dynamic development but also to future interactions in
the region. This book does not offer such a depthful
exploration of whether China will emerge as a superpower. This
is not a criticism of the book, because the theme of
U.S.-Japan-China tripartite relations is so complex. Rather,
for the purpose of the long-term peace and prosperity in the
region, this book offers a valuable beginning.
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